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Abstract
We develop a simple overlapping generations model to analytically show that
population aging leads to increased educational e®orts through a general equilibrium
e®ect. The key mechanism at work in the model is that scarcity of raw labor increases
the rate of return to human capital relative to physical capital. While a reduction
in the birth rate is shown to unambiguously increase educational e®orts, increases in
the survival rate have ambiguous e®ects. Falling birth rates unambiguously increase
capital per worker while the e®ects of rising survival rates are ambiguous. When
evaluating our model using a calibrated version we ¯nd that education always in-
creases if life expectancy rises but the e®ect on the capital stock is still ambiguous
and depends on the parameters of the model. We conclude that our model is a useful
laboratory to highlight the various potentially o®setting e®ects at work in models
with endogenous education and overlapping generations which is key for understand-
ing the magnitudes of results of applied quantitative general equilibrium analyses
employing such a framework.
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11 Introduction
Important aspects of economic history are the decline in mortality, the associated increase
in life expectancy and a notable rise in investment into human capital. Life expectancy
at birth in the UK was about 40 years in 1850, 65 years in 1950 and rose by 10 more
years until the year 2000 (Cutler et al. 2006). The share of children aged 10-14 attending
primary schools rose from 10% in 1820 to 80% in 1930 (Flora et al. 1983). Universal
schooling was reached soon thereafter. The same development took place for secondary
and tertiary education. Net enrollment rates for secondary schooling increased from 67%
in 1970 to 95% in 2000 (The World Bank 2004). As can be seen, these process of rising
life expectancy, falling birth rates and investment into human capital are still going on
in modern economies. The combined e®ect is that the population structure of developed
countries is changing rapidly with a rising share of elderly people. This rise of the old-age
dependency ratio and the associated rise in social security contributions have shifted the
\aging problem" into the focus of the academic literature as well as public policy.
In this paper we develop an analytically tractable two generations OLG model in the
spirit of Diamond (1965) in order to study the e®ects of demographic change on educational
investment decisions and capital accumulation. We augment the simple textbook model
with endogenous human capital formation. Population dynamics|the exogenous driving
force of our model|are modeled by considering uncertain survival to old age and birth
rates separately. Additionally, we look at the e®ects of changing lifetime labor supply. The
strength of our setup is that we can analyze the general equilibrium e®ects of population
dynamics using closed form solutions. The contribution of our paper is that using this rich
setup, we are able to show that changes in life expectancy, population growth and lifetime
labor supply have, in general, ambiguous e®ects on the capital stock and education. We
demonstrate that it is key to consider the interactions between annuity markets, the pension
system and productivity of education for understanding the qualitative and quantitative
e®ects of variations in the population structure on changes in physical and human capital
accumulation.
The relationship between mortality and investment into human capital has been in-
vestigated is a number of theoretical and empirical studies. Empirical studies ¯nd that
falling mortality and the associated rise in life expectancy increase investment into human
capital. Using data for post-war India, Ram and Schultz (1979) ¯nd that improvements in
mortality played a major role in the rise of educational attainment. Eckstein et al. (1999)
provide evidence for Sweden that the fall in child mortality was the most important factor
for the demographic transition and the rising educational attainment. On the other hand,
Mincer (1995) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) present empirical evidence that rising
education premia have a positive e®ect on schooling.
Theoretical work dealing with the ageing-education nexus by Boucekkine et al. (2002),
de la Croix and Licandro (1999), Echevarria and Iza (2006) and Heijdra and Romp (2008)
use variations of a Blanchard (1985) type of perpetual youth setup. By employing this
model family the authors obtain closed form solutions and derive a number of insights by
relying entirely on analytical results. These papers assume that the production processes
2use only labor (human capital) as an input or they consider only small open economies.
Thus, the general equilibrium feedback e®ect of population dynamics on relative prices is
ruled out by construction. A general conclusion of this literature is that increasing life
expectancy increases investment into human and physical capital.
The papers by Hu (1999) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) are closest in spirit to our
work. They also employ a perpetual youth setup but overcome the limitations of the above
mentioned papers by developing tractable general equilibrium models. Our contributions
to their work are threefold. First, we do not only study the e®ects of changes in mortality
but also the e®ects of changing fertility on investment in education and human as well as
physical capital accumulation. Second, we also analyze how changes in the lifetime work-
ing horizon a®ect educational decisions and capital accumulation. This additional channel
in our model stands in for a lifelong learning motive and is increasingly important in ag-
ing societies which reform their PAYG ¯nanced pension systems by increasing retirement
ages. Third, by using an OLG rather than a perpetual youth model, we recon¯rm some of
the ¯ndings of the above mentioned authors: Rising survival rates may lead to increasing
educational e®orts and capital accumulation. However, we emphasize that there are poten-
tially important o®setting e®ects. The lower degree of analytical tractability of our OLG
model|in comparison to the perpetual youth model|buys us the possibility to include
and to understand several interaction e®ects and to show how these may change results.
For example, using an equilibrium relationship of their model, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000)
argue that the interest rate varies positively with mortality, \as would be expected from
the simple intuition that shorter lives lead to lower wealth accumulation" (p. 11). We show
that this positive e®ect is smaller when annuity markets are larger and that, by interpret-
ing an equilibrium condition only, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) ignore two important and
potentially o®setting e®ects: increasing mortality (i) decreases the workforce and (ii) may
decrease educational e®orts and both e®ects ceteris paribus lead to a negative variation of
mortality and the interest rate.
Finally, Zhang, Zhang, and Lee (2001) add to this literature by modeling endogenous
fertility and child education employing a two-generations OLG setup as we do but using
a dynastic framework. These di®erences in the two approaches makes their work less
suitable as a benchmark for comparison. Furthermore, as a consequence of the endogenous
nature of fertility decisions, these authors cannot study the impact of changing fertility
and mortality in isolation as we do.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
The results of the comparative static analysis are derived in section 3. In the same section
we also show the results of our calibration exercise where we perform an extensive sensitivity
analysis. Some concluding remarks are in section 4. Separate appendices contain proofs
and additional results.
32 The Model
We develop a simple OLG model with endogenous education decisions and a PAYG ¯nanced
social security system. The setup is as follows: agents live for two periods whereby survival
to the second period is uncertain. In the ¯rst period agents choose time investment into
education, saving and consumption. In the second period they consume their entire wealth
and work only an exogenously given fraction ! of their time. The rest of their time (1 -
!) they are retired and receive a lump-sum pension, pt+1. We make this assumption for
analytical tractability; it allows us to analyze the e®ects of di®erent social security regimes
in a model of human capital accumulation a la Ben-Porath (1967) within a 2-generations
model. In this setup, the parameter ! re°ects a motive for life-long learning which can be
a®ected by policy, e.g., by increasing the retirement age.
2.1 Demographics
Each period, there are Nt;0 young households and Nt;1 old. Let °N
t be the birth rate so that
Nt;0 = °N
t Nt¡1;0 and st be the survival rate, hence Nt;1 = stNt¡1;0. Using these de¯nitions,










2.2 Markets for Annuities
We assume the existence of (imperfect) annuity markets for insurance against survival risk.










³t+1 ´ st+1 + ¸(1 ¡ st+1) (3)
is an annuity factor introduced here for convenience and 0 · ¸ · 1 is the degree of
annuitization, also see Hansen and _ Imrohoro¸ glu (2008). Notice that, in the case of no
annuitization, we have ¸ = 0 and ³t+1 = st+1 and for complete (perfect) annuity markets
we have ¸ = 1 and ³t+1 = 1. Full annuitization implies that the assets of the deceased
agents are distributed uniformly among the surviving old agents which is an insurance
against longevity (Yaari 1965).
Without annuity markets there is no \insurance e®ect" but agents receive a lump-sum
payment trt+1 from the government. To keep the analysis analytically tractable we assume
that in the case of incomplete annuitization the government distributes the accidental
4bequests to the old.1 Accidental bequests are then redistributed to households as lump-
sum transfers and given by
trt+1 = (1 ¡ ¸)
at;0(1 + rt+1)(1 ¡ st+1)Nt;0
Nt+1;1
: (4)
and, using the fact that
Nt+1;1 = Nt;ost+1;
we have
trt+1 = (1 ¡ ¸)




Households maximize expected lifetime utility
max
ct;0;ct+1;1
logct;0 + ¯st+1 logct+1;1; (6)
subject to the constraints




at;0 + !ht+1;1wt+1(1 ¡ ¿t+1) + (1 ¡ !)pt+1 + trt+1; (7b)
where ¯ is the raw time discount factor, et is investment into education when young, h0 is
the stock of human capital given at birth (taken as exogenous and constant over cohorts),
wt is the wage rate per unit of human capital, rt+1 is the return on ¯nancial assets, ¿t
denotes the social security contribution rate, pt+1 are lump-sum pension payments, and
trt+1 are the distributed accidental bequests.
Due to the representative agent setup, two interpretations of ! are conceivable. In the
¯rst interpretation ! is the fraction of time the representative agent of age 1 works. In the
second, it is the fraction in the population of age 1 that works. Either way, ! works like
a policy variable and a change in ! could be interpreted, e.g., as a change in retirement
legislation or labor market incentives a®ecting participation rates.





(1 ¡ et)h0wt(1 ¡ ¿t) + st+1
!ht+1;1wt+1(1 ¡ ¿t+1) + (1 ¡ !)pt+1 + trt+1
³t+1(1 + rt+1)
: (8)
1To see why this assumption is useful assume that bequests are distributed to the young. Then, transfers
are given by
trt = (1 ¡ ¸)
at¡1;0(1 + rt)(1 ¡ st)Nt¡1;0
Nt;0





As at¡1;0 shows up in the above equation, the analysis would involve a second-order di®erence equation
for kt which would tremendously reduce analytical tractability. Assuming that bequests are distributed to
the young and old will obviously cause the same problem.
5The education technology is
ht+1;1 = (1 + g(et))h0; (9)
with g being a function mapping educational investment into formation of human capital.
We choose g such that it is increasing, concave in e and ful¯lls the lower Inada condi-
tion. These are standard assumptions about the education function (see Willis (1986)).2
Later, we specify a parametric form for g(et) to obtain a closed form solution. Solving the
maximization problem gives the Euler equation
ct+1;1 = ¯³t+1(1 + rt+1)ct;0: (10)








This condition says that an individual invests into schooling until the marginal return of
schooling equals the return on net wages relative to the e®ective interest rate. Following
Bouzahzah et al. (2002), we de¯ne the education function g(et) in (9) as
g(et) = »e
Ã
t ; where 0 < Ã < 1; » > 0: (12)











It can be seen that educational decisions depend positively on the ratio of net wage growth
to the return on capital holdings. This is the key general equilibrium e®ect we are interested
in. The scarcity of raw labor resulting from demographic change will lead to rising wages
and falling interest rates. According to equation (13) this will induce general equilibrium
feedback e®ects by leading to increases in education and thereby to an increase in the
second period human capital.
In addition to these general equilibrium e®ects, equation (13) shows direct e®ects on
educational e®orts through the educational productivity, » and Ã, the fraction of time
working in the second period, ! and the probability of survival if there is some annuitiza-
tion, i.e., if ¸ > 0. The direct e®ect of survival on educational decisions has in part been
labeled as an e®ect due to an extension of the adult planning horizon, e.g., by Heijdra
and Romp (2008). This is a misleading interpretation because the direct e®ect of survival
is in fact a result of the induced adjustment of the rate of return to physical capital if
2For analytical reasons, we assume zero depreciation of human capital and we do not make h an
argument of g as in the standard Ben-Porath (1967) technology. This parametric restriction is also super-
imposed in some empirical studies, see the review in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999).
6there is some annuitization.3 In the absence of annuitization, there is no adjustment of
the rate of return to physical capital to the survival rate and changes in the survival rate
have a direct e®ect only on the inter-temporal allocation of consumption (via the changing
e®ective discount rate st+1¯). In our model, the \pure" e®ect of extending the planing
horizon is represented by an increase in !.





(1 ¡ et)h0wt(1 ¡ ¿t) + st+1
!ht+1;1wt+1(1 ¡ ¿t+1) + (1 ¡ !)pt+1 + trt+1
³t+1(1 + rt+1)
¶




(¯st+1(1 ¡ et)h0wt(1 ¡ ¿t)¡
st+1










At is the ¯rm's technology level which is determined by
At+1 = At°
A; (16)
where °A is the exogenous gross growth rate. Lt is e®ective labor input which is the sum
of human capital weighted labor supply of the young and of the old and accordingly given
by
Lt = (1 ¡ et)h0Nt;0 + !ht;1Nt;1: (17)
Competitive markets ensure that factors get paid their marginal products. We assume
that capital depreciates fully after one period so that
1 + rt = ®k
®¡1
t (18a)
wt = (1 ¡ ®)Atk
®
t ; (18b)
where kt ´ Kt
AtLt.
3This has already been shown by Hu (1999).
72.5 Government
The role of the government is twofold. First, the government taxes accidental bequests in
the case of incomplete annuitization at a con¯scatory rate and redistributes them as lump-
sum payments to the old. Second, the government runs a PAYG ¯nanced social security
system with a balanced budget in all periods requiring that total contributions by workers
equal total pension payments.4 By equation (17) we then have
wt¿t ((1 ¡ et)h0Nt;0 + !ht;1Nt;1) = (1 ¡ !)ptNt;1: (19)
Notice that the above, using equation (1), implies that









Changes in the population structure require adjustments of the social security policy.
Let %t denote the replacement rate, i.e., the ratio of pension income to average net wage
income. Then pension income can be expressed as
pt = %t
(1 ¡ ¿t)wt ((1 ¡ et)h0Nt;0 + !ht;1Nt;1)
Nt;0 + !Nt;1
:





t =st + ! + (1 ¡ !)%t
: (21)
It can be readily observed that ¿t increases in the fraction of pensioners, 1¡!, the generosity
of the pension system, %t, and in the old-age dependency ratio, st=°N
t . Using this setup,
¯xing ¿t = ¹ ¿ corresponds to a ¯xed contribution rate system and holding %t = ¹ % corresponds
to a ¯xed replacement rate system.5
2.6 Equilibrium
In equilibrium all markets clear, households maximize utility and ¯rms make zero pro¯ts.
Market clearing on the capital market requires that
Kt+1 = at;0Nt;0: (22)
Using (1) in (17), aggregate labor supply can be rewritten as
Lt = Nt;0h0
µ







4While we explicitly model this inter-generational transfer system as a pension system, it may also be
interpreted as a metaphor for a more general intergenerational transfer system, e.g., a health care system.
5Notice that these de¯nitions are not the same as what is referred to as de¯ned contribution and de¯ned
bene¯t systems in the literature.
8Collecting elements, the following proposition gives the law of motion of the aggregate
economy.
Proposition 1. For given k0 the aggregate dynamics of the economy are described by the
system of ¯rst-order di®erence equations in fkt;etg given by
kt+1 =




















®(2 + ^ ½t+1) + 't
(1 ¡ ®)¿t+1
³t+1









®(2 + ^ ½t+1) + 't
1 ¡ ®
³t+1







(2 + ^ ½t+1)³t+1
(2 + ^ ½t+1)³t+1 + (1 ¡ st+1)(1 ¡ ¸))
(25b)
and ^ ½t+1 = 1
st+1¯ ¡ 1.
Proof. Relegated to the appendix.
Proposition 2. If there is an equilibrium, education et is always interior on the interval
(0;1). Further, education converges always to its steady state value.
Proof. Relegated to the appendix.
2.7 Steady State Analysis
De¯nition 1. Along the balanced growth path (steady state) of the economy, all variables
grow at constant rates so that k = kt+1 = kt and e = et+1 = et 8 t.
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(1 ¡ ®)¿
³






®(2 + ^ ½) + '
1 ¡ ®
³







(2 + ^ ½)³
(2 + ^ ½)³ + (1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ ¸)
(27b)
and ^ ½ = 1
s¯ ¡ 1.
Proof. Relegated to the appendix.
3 Comparative Statics
In this section, we use our framework to study the e®ects of demographic change on the
economy by conducting a comparative statics analysis in steady state. In this respect our
model is a useful laboratory to provide intuition for the results of much of the quantitative
work, e.g., by Fougµ ere and M¶ erette (16), Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002), Bouzahzah
et al. (2002) and Ludwig et al. (2008). To this end, we analyze|by looking at partial
derivatives|the e®ects of changing fertility, mortality and working time on the capital
stock and education. We ¯rst do so in a social security scenario with constant contributions
rates and then consider the opposite extreme by holding replacement rates constant. While
we can uniquely determine the signs of many partially derivatives, we fail to do so in
some cases. In these cases, our closed form solutions help us to understand the various
o®setting e®ects at work and to detect the sources of indeterminacy. Finally, we use a
calibrated version of our model to illustrate how the signs of partial derivatives depend on
the parametrization of the model in the ambiguous cases.
3.1 Analytical Results
We drop the time indices to indicate steady state values. To begin with, we provide ana-
lytical results followed by an interpretation. Detailed proofs are available in the appendix.
Proposition 4. In the steady state of the economy we have


















































































































































Proof. Relegated to the appendix.
Interpretation of the partial derivatives of the capital stock and education in equation
(28a) is rather straightforward. First, observe from (26b) that there is no direct e®ect
of the birth rate, °N, on the education decision, e. Second, an increase of the birth
rate increases the e®ective supply of labor in the economy which decreases k, cf. (26a) and
(27a). Therefore, a change in the birth rate a®ects the relative prices of physical and human
capital through its e®ect on k. An increase of k increases the wage rate, w, and decreases
the return on physical capital, r. While the growth rate of wages (
wt+1
wt ) is unchanged in our
steady state comparison, the return on physical capital decreases. Consequently, optimal
education goes up, cf. (13).
As stated in the proposition, the signs of the partial derivatives in (28b) cannot be
determined unambiguously. First, notice that there are various e®ects from increases of
s on savings and thus k at work, cf. (27a): (i) an increase of s decreases the e®ective
discount rate ^ ½ which increases k. This is so because an increase of the survival rate
increases savings via its e®ect on current period income, cf. the ¯rst term in the brackets
of (14). (ii), however, an increase in the survival rate also increases the value of second
period income as long as ¸ > 0 (so that st+1=³t+1 < 1) which dampens the increase of
savings. This dampening e®ect is the stronger, the larger is the size of the annuity market,
i.e., the higher is ¸.6 (iii) for ¸ > 0, there is a direct e®ect of survival on education, cf.
(26b), which varies positively with ¸. This increases e®ective labor supply and thereby
tends to decrease k. (iv) as s increases, raw labor supply increases as long as ! > 0. Observe
that the last two e®ects are stronger when the average human capital productivity is high,
because ! interacts with » via the term
1+g(e)
1¡e in (27a).
This discussion explains why the signs of the e®ects of s on k cannot be determined
unambiguously. It can only be said that the capital stock is likely to increase if !, ¸ and
» are su±ciently small. For too high values of these parameters, the reaction of e®ective
labor supply is too strong and the capital stock kt may decrease (so that rt+1 increases).
Second, this ambiguity with respect to the e®ects of s on k translates into an ambiguous
e®ect of s on e, cf. (26b). However, even if k varies negatively with s, education may
6As can be immediately observed from (14), the overall e®ect of increasing survival on savings is
unambiguously positive. But it is larger for ¸ = 0 than for ¸ = 1.
11still increase because of the direct e®ect of increasing survival on the education decision in
the presence of annuity markets (¸ > 0). Indeed, in all of our simulations of subsection
3.3, schooling is found to increase if s rises, also in those cases in which k decreases when
annuity markets are perfect. On the contrary, with missing annuity markets, we never
¯nd that k decreases in s so that there is also no ambiguity in the resulting educational
adjustments.
The e®ect of a changing lifetime labor supply ! given in equation (28c) is unambiguously
negative for the capital stock but ambiguous for the optimal education decision. First,
increasing ! increases total e®ective labor supply and thus decreases k. Second, an increase
of ! has a direct e®ect on education, cf. (13). This leads to an additional increase of
e®ective labor which further decreases k. However, third, a decrease of k also exerts a
dampening e®ect on education by increasing the return on physical capital. As this third
e®ect is only a second order general equilibrium feedback e®ect, it cannot o®set the decrease
of k which explains the unambiguous sign for the partial derivative of k. However, the direct
e®ect of ! on k and the resulting general equilibrium price e®ect could potentially be strong
enough to o®set the direct e®ect of ! on education. This explains the ambiguous sign of
the partial derivative of e. While this is so analytically, we show below for a wide range of
parameter constellations of our simulations that education varies positively with !.
The e®ect of an adjustment of the contribution rate ¿ is examined in the second part of
proposition 4. Recall that changing the contribution rate has only a direct e®ect on capital
accumulation but does not distort education decisions in steady state. Thus, increasing the
contribution rate only has an e®ect on steady state education to the extent that it crowds
out savings in physical capital. The uniform conclusion is therefore that a rising (falling)
contribution rate decreases (increases) the capital stock, thereby increases (decreases) the
interest rate and thus decreases (increases) the incentives to invest into education. A brief
verbal summary of the results is that the e®ect of falling birth rates, rising survival rates,
i.e., an aging of the population, or an extension of the lifetime labor supply has a larger
e®ect (in absolute values) on the capital stock and on education if the contribution rate ¿
is held constant. The results do not say, however, that the signs do not change. Since we
add one layer of complexity, it is even harder to pin down the direction of change.
3.2 Role of annuity markets
This subsection discusses the role of the degree of annuitization in more detail. We show
in the appendix that
Proposition 5. In the steady state of the economy we have


















































Proof. Relegated to the appendix.
More complete annuity markets increase savings but have an ambiguous e®ect on the
education decision. Again, the ambiguity comes from the fact that the direct e®ect of
increasing annuitization on the interest rate|which reduces educational investments, c.f.
equation (26b)|may be o®set by the indirect e®ect of rising capital|which decreases the
interest rate and thereby increases education. Furthermore, the e®ect of ¸ on capital and
education is the same in both social security scenarios. This is so because the adjustment
of the contribution or replacement rate does not interact with ¸.
More interesting is, however, how the level of ¸ interacts with the derivatives of k and
e with respect to s, °N and !. Unfortunately, due to the algebraic complexity of the
problem, it is not possible to obtain clear results for these cross-derivatives. However, as
is shown in appendix A, a higher ¸ makes it more likely that @k=@s < 0. Further results
on the importance of annuity markets are illustrated in our numerical simulations, cf., in
particular, the discussion in subsection 3.3.2.
3.3 Numerical Results
As stated in the previous subsection, there are cases in which the sign of the derivatives
are ambiguous. For these cases we here present results from numerical simulations of
our model to illustrate the sources for this ambiguity. Obviously, our stylized two period
model fails to capture many relevant aspects. This exercise is therefore an illustration
only and is not meant to provide exact quantitative results of population aging on the
economy. We ¯rst investigate the case with perfect annuity markets and then the case
without annuity markets. Furthermore, we redo the calculations for both scenarios with
constant contribution and constant replacement rates.
3.3.1 Perfect Annuity Markets
In this subsection we focus on the case with perfect annuity markets (¸ = 1) where the
direct e®ects of changing survival rates on the education decision is strongest and con-
sequently the e®ects of changing survival are likely to be ambiguous, cf. our previous
discussion in subsection 3.1 and the appendix. Furthermore, the case with perfect annu-
ity markets, although empirically doubtful, makes our results directly comparable to the
perpetual youth model of Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000).
We take the periodicity of the model such that each generation covers a maximum
of 40 years. Agents are assumed to become economically active at the actual age of 20.
Correspondingly, the maximum age agents can reach is 100. Our calibration targets for
some of the population parameters are for averages of the three core European countries
13France, Germany and Italy.7 For the survival rate, s, we take as calibration target the
remaining life expectancy at the age of 20, LE20, which is currently (in 2004) 68 years.
As survival in our model is certain in the ¯rst period of life, the survival rate is given by
s = LE20=40 ¡ 1:0 = 0:69. We calibrate °N using the implied °N to match the old-age
dependency ratio of 44%. Accordingly, we set °N = 1:5574.8 The long-run growth rate
of productivity in European countries is roughly 0:015 (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003)
annually so that °A = 1:01540 = 1:81. We set the discount factor ¯ = 0:9940 = 0:67 by
reference to other studies, e.g., Hurd (1990).
The most critical parameters are ! and Ã, and ». First, we calibrate Ã to medium
value of the estimates reported in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) which is 0:6.
Second, there is no direct empirical counterpart of ! because it just re°ects an auxiliary
variable in our model that simpli¯es the exposition. To calibrate this parameter we use
the share of agents obtaining higher education as the calibration target.9 Since the timing
of the model is such that the ¯rst (and economically passive) period is 20 years, education
can be also viewed as the share of people investing into higher education (university and
post-graduate education). We construct aggregate indices using data from OECD (2008).10
The procedure is as follows. We compute the average graduation age of a typical student
for the two university (or equivalent) diploma categories (Type A and B). Then we use this
number to compute how many years a person spends in tertiary education in excess of the
economic starting age (which is set to 20). For example, the \average" French student (see
table 1) is obtaining a type A diploma at the age of 24.5 and a type B diploma at the age
of 22. We then weight the \excess years" (4.5 and 2) by the population weights (0.11 and
0.15) to obtain years of tertiary education of a representative French agent (0.775). Then,
we weight the country speci¯c years by the population of the three countries to compute
years of education for the \representative European" (0.874). As a last step, we divide
this number by the duration of one period (40 years) to convert it into the model speci¯c
equivalent and use it as a calibration target. Hence, our target for e is e = 0:01988. Third,
we calibrate » endogenously to match the ratio of peak life cycle wages to the wage rate
at labor market entry which is 1:6 (Attanasio 1999). Since we set h0 = 1, this is the data
equivalent to human capital holdings of the old, h1, and our calibration target requires
» = 6:30. Parameters are summarized in table 2.
As our discussion of the analytical results in subsection 3.1 shows, the most critical
parameters in the case of perfect annuitization (¸ = 1) are s;!;»;Ã. We therefore consider
a range of alternative speci¯cations around the benchmark speci¯cation in table 2 for all
7Our population data are based on the Human Mortality Database (2008).
8The alternative would be to calibrate °N with the gross growth rate of the working age population
ratio. This would require to set °N = 1:06. The implied oadr is then 0:66 and hence this alternative would
overestimate the actual old-age dependency.
9Alternative calibration targets are e.g. the fraction of the old (age 60 and older) in the population
who work which is 5:4% in the data. In our model this implies ! = 0:12 and e = 0:0077 (0.31 years of
education). The choice of this alternative measure does not change our conclusions (results available upon
request).
10The data we use can be found in tables A1.1a, A1.3a and X1.1c. See also the same publication for
more detailed information on the educational systems and de¯nitions.
14Table 1: Calibration Target for Time in Tertiary Education
Graduation Age Share in Population Weighted Years
Type of Diploma B A B A B+A
France 22.0 24.5 0.11 0.15 0.775
Germany 22.0 25.5 0.09 0.14 0.950
Italy 22.5 26.0 0.01 0.12 0.601
Total 0.795
Graduation age refers to the average within the particular type of diploma. The country weights (France
0.31, Germany 0.40 and Italy 0.39) are given by the relative population size in 2006 computed from the
Human Mortality Database (2008).
these parameters. The graphs have ! 2 (0;1) on the horizontal axis. The di®erent lines are
always drawn for a tuple from f»­sg for selected values for » and s where the intermediate
values (solid lines) are from the benchmark calibration. Finally, in order to address the
sensitivity of our results with respect to the concavity of the education technology we redo
all calculations for Ã = 0:3.11 We recalibrate the model when we change the value of Ã.
The vertical black line is the calibrated value of !. Observe that with lower concavity of the
education technology (lower Ã), the calibrated value of ! is increased substantially to match
the same target. Instead of reporting the rather uninformative numbers for the derivatives,
in the ¯gures we show elasticities which are better comparable across calibrations.
The e®ect of changing survival rates on the capital stock are displayed in ¯gure 1. As
claimed in proposition 4, the sign is ambiguous. The sign is more likely to be negative
for high survival rates, high marginal productivity of education (Ã and ») and high labor
market participation in the second period (high !). Obviously, the higher the marginal
product of education (as determined by » and Ã), the more will agents invest into education
and the less they will work and save. The e®ect of ! goes into the same direction since it
is reinforcing the e®ect of education.
Figure 2 shows the elasticity of education with respect to the survival rate. Although
we show in proposition 4 that the sign cannot be determined unambiguously, the elasticity
is always positive in our simulations. Rising survival rates always increase educational
attainment. The simulations also show that the elasticity is smaller for high values of »
and higher survival rates. The curvature of the human capital production function Ã has
only a minor in°uence.
Finally, ¯gure 3 shows how education varies with the time spent on the labor market in
the second period. Although the sign cannot be determined analytically, the simulations
show that education always increases if ! increases. Thus, the direct e®ect of a rising ! is
not overturned by a general equilibrium e®ect of rising interest rates. The factor having
the largest in°uence is Ã which governs the shape of the marginal productivity of schooling
11For the sake of brevity, simulation results with varying ® and ¯ are not displayed but are available
upon request.
15Figure 1: Elasticity of k with respect to s
(a) Benchmark concavity (Ã = 0:6)
(i) constant ¿
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16Figure 2: Elasticity of e with respect to s
(a) Benchmark concavity (Ã = 0:6)
(i) constant ¿
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17Table 2: Calibration parameters
Firm sector Ã = 0:6 Ã = 0:3
Capital share, ® 0.3 0.3
Technological progress, °A 1.81 1.81
Household sector
Discount factor, ¯ 0.67 0.67
Average productivity of human capital investments, » 6.30 1.94
Coe±cient in human capital production function, Ã 0.6 0.3
Fraction of the old working, ! 0.36 0.94
Social Security
Replacement rate, % 0.6 0.6
Demographics
Birth rate, °N 1.56 1.56
Survival rate, s 0.69 0.69
investment and other parameters seem to have only a small e®ect on the behavior of the
model. Not surprisingly, with more concavity of the human capital production function
the (positive) e®ect of increasing lifetime labor supply on the education decision increases.
3.3.2 No Annuity Markets
This subsection provides a sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in the degree of
annuitization. We set ¸ = 0 (corresponding to an economy without annuity markets),
recalibrate the model using the same calibration targets as above and report the new
parameters in table 3 in the appendix. Since only the partial derivative @k=@s changes its
sign if we vary ¸ we here only show this result in ¯gure 4. The other ¯gures can be found
in appendix B.
Indeed with ¸ = 0 the reaction of the capital stock to changes in the survival rate is
always positive, whereas for ¸ = 1 it may also be negative. Thus, the degree of completeness
of annuity markets has an important e®ect on the reaction of the economy. The qualitative
e®ects of changes in the population growth rate, °N, and lifetime labor supply, !, are not
a®ected by the choice of ¸ (see appendix B).
4 Conclusion
This paper investigates the e®ects of a changing population structure on capital accumula-
tion and educational investment in a tractable two period model in the spirit of Diamond
(1965). We vary the population structure by three dimensions, ¯rst, by the fertility rate,
second, by the survival rate and, third, by the degree of old-age labor supply. We show
18Figure 3: Elasticity of e with respect to !
(a) Benchmark concavity (Ã = 0:6)
(i) constant ¿
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19Figure 4: Elasticity of k with respect to s: No Annuity Markets
(a) Benchmark concavity (Ã = 0:6)
(i) constant ¿
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20that a decrease of the fertility rate and a corresponding increase of the old-age dependency
ratio unambiguously increases the capital intensity and education if contribution rates to
the pension system are held constant. An increase of the survival rate, on the other hand,
does not unambiguously vary with these variables. Our analytical results and our numeri-
cal illustrations shed light on the sources for this ambiguity by highlighting the various and
potentially o®setting interaction e®ects at work. Therefore, our tractable model is a useful
laboratory for understanding the magnitudes of the e®ects found in applied quantitative
work employing models with overlapping generations.
21A Proofs




















t+1 + !st+1(1 + g(et))
¢
: (33)
Next, we focus on the RHS of (32). Using (5), (9) and (20) in (14) and bringing the





















Bringing the term postmultiplying at;0 to the RHS, replacing rt and wt by their marginal


























(1 + ¯st+1)³t+1 + (1 ¡ st+1)(1 ¡ ¸)
: (35)


















(1 ¡ et)(1 ¡ ¿t)k
®
t :




















°A (1 ¡ et)(1 ¡ ¿t)k
®
t :
The expression for et immediately follows from replacing wages and interest rates by their
respective counterparts from equations (18a) and (18b). Using ^ ½ = 1
¯st+1 ¡ 1 proves the
claim in the proposition.
Proof of proposition 2. First, given that the function g(e) satis¯es the lower Inada con-
dition with lime!0 g0(e) ! 1 the solution with zero education is excluded for ! 2 (0;1].
Second, having full educational investment (i.e. e = 1), labor supply and thus wage income
of the young generation is zero. By the lower Inada condition of the utility function, we
have that ct;0 > 0 for positive wages. Consequently, savings in the ¯rst period would be
negative and so will be the capital stock of the economy. Thus, if there is an equilibrium
with ¯nite and positive capital stock, education will always be lower than unity.
To show that education always converges to the steady state solution use (24a) in (24b)


















®(2 + ^ ½t+1) + 't
(1 ¡ ®)¿t+1
³t+1







®(2 + ^ ½t+1) + 't
1 ¡ ®
³t+1
(1 + ^ ½t+1)
¶
De¯ning ¢t ´ et ¡ et+1(k¤) as measuring the distance between et and et+1 which is ul-
timately a function of the steady state capital stock. Thus, ¢t measures the change in


























23Therefore, if education is, e.g., below its new steady state level after an exogenous shock
(i.e., ¢t < 0), et will always converge monotonically to the new steady state value.
Proof of proposition 3. Existence:








Nkt+1 ¡ ~ a(wt(kt);rt+1(kt+1);et(kt+1)): (38a)
Where d(¢) is the change in the capital stock per e®ective worker. Given that we use
log-utility, et 2 (0;1) and a Cobb-Douglas production function it holds that








where ~ wt denotes wages scaled by the level of technology. All we have to show is that d(¢)
has opposite signs for kt+1 going to zero and in¯nity. Then by continuity of d(¢) there is





















= ¡1 < 0 (38f)
for su±ciently small kt+1. For uniqueness it is su±cient to show that @d(wt;rt+1)=@kt+1 > 0
for all k, i.e. that for a given wage rate d(wt;rt+1) is nondecreasing in the capital stock.
Taking equation (25a) and recalling that @e=@k > 0 establishes the result. By using
equation (26b) it is clear that a unique solution for the capital stock automatically gives a
unique e.





1¡® ¡ k = 0 (39a)
F2(k;e;°























and Á is as in (27a) and ' as in (27b).
1. For the case where ¿ = ¹ ¿, we can ignore that ¿ is related to °N and s by the steady
state version of (21). The general problem with two implicitly de¯ned endogenous

















































































Since ¿ = ¹ ¿, we get
@F1
@k





















1¡Ã¡1 > 0 (45c)
@F2
@e
= ¡1 < 0 (45d)
whereby the sign in (45b) follows from @­











@k | {z }
<0
> 0: (46)
25(a) To determine the e®ect of a changing population growth rate °N on k and e we







@°N < 0 (47a)
@F2
@°N = 0; (47b)
whereby (47a) follows from @­
@°N < 0, cf. equations (40) and (27a). To get an






Á2 < 0 (48)
since ' is independent of °N and Á is a positive function of °N, cf. equa-
tions (26a) and (27). Thus, °N has a direct e®ect on k but only an indirect

















































A < 0: (49b)
(b) To derive the analogous steps for di®erentiation of (39) with respect to s, replace

































































A ? 0: (51b)
26Intuitively, the ambiguity of @e
@s results from the fact that, holding k constant,
e is increasing in s as long as ¸ > 0 (direct e®ect), but the capital stock may
increase or decrease in s for given education e. As e increases in k monotonically,
the ambiguity of @k
@s translates into the ambiguity of @e
@s (indirect e®ect of s on
e).







= ®(1 ¡ ®)¯(1 ¡ ¿)
'0Á ¡ 'Á0
Á2 ? 0 (52)
where Á0 = @Á=@s and '0 = @'=@s, cf. equation (26a). It can be shown that
'0 > 0. Consequently, the sign of
@Á
@s determines the sign of
@F1
@s (and thus @­
@s)
and therefore the sign of equation (50a) is unambiguous only if
@Á
@s < 0.
To see what determines the sign of Á0, observe from (27a) that s enters in three
places: (i) s pre-multiplies the term !
1+g(e)
1¡e , (ii) s decreases the e®ective discount
rate ^ ½, and (iii) s increases the annuity factor, ³, as long as ¸ < 1. Consequently,
Á increases in s by e®ect (i) whereas it decreases in s by the e®ects (ii) and (iii).
We can therefore study an upper bound of Á0 by setting ¸ = 1 so that e®ect (iii)
is not at work.
This helps clarifying the interaction at the cost of introducing a special case.
Using ^ ½ = 1
¯s ¡ 1 in (27a) and taking the derivative of the resulting equation












1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®) (1 ¡ ¿)
i
? 0;
which is ambiguous.12 The right part of this equation consists only of exogenous
variables. The left part involves the endogenous education decision e for which
no closed form solution is available. Thus, it is not possible to show analytically
that the derivative has an unambiguous sign. However, constructing a few
special cases clari¯es under which conditions
@Á
@s < 0 may hold.
































(® + (1 ¡ ®)¹¿) + ¹0°N(1 ¡ ®)¿
s¯
where it is obvious that the last two terms are negative (¹ > 0 and ¹0 < 0) but the sign of term in the
¯rst bracket is ambiguous again. Thus, by setting ¸ = 1 (perfect annuity markets) which implies
'
³ = 1
we know that Á0j0·¸<1 < Á0j¸=1 holds.









1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¿)
i
? 0:
Summarizing the arguments made so far, the sign of
@Á
@s is negative (implying
that k is increasing in s) if
² returns to education are low (low » and/or Ã)
² the horizon over which the bene¯ts can be reaped is short (low !)
² the discount factor ¯ is low (i.e. high discount rate)
² the population growth rate °N is high
² and the survival probability s is low.






































































A ? 0: (54b)
Some intuition why the sign of @e=@! is indeterminate can be gained by writing






















Hence, the ambiguity is caused by the negative e®ect of rising labor market par-
ticipation on the capital stock (@­=@! < 0) and the positive counterbalancing
e®ect of more education (!¡1) due to a higher lifetime labor supply !.
On the contrary, the reason why the sign of @k=@! can always be determined is
















where @­=@! < 0 captures the direct e®ect of more labor and the second part
captures the additional e®ect of changing education.
282. In case % = ¹ %, there is a direct (d) and an indirect e®ect in the partial derivatives of
­, @­








°N ¹ ½(1 ¡ !)
(s(¹ ½(1 ¡ !) + !) + °N)2 > 0 (55)
@¿
@°N = ¡
s¹ ½(1 ¡ !)




s¹ ½(s + °N)
(s(¹ ½(1 ¡ !) + !) + °N)2 < 0 (57)
Therefore, for given °N, s, and !, the strength of the indirect e®ect increases in ¹ %.
Note that changing the adjustment rule of the social security system a®ects only F1
because there is no direct e®ect of ¿ on the education decision in steady state. Due
to the additional indirect e®ect, it is not possible any more to determine the sign
of the derivatives. We can only say, whether the e®ects become smaller or larger,
compared to the ¿ = ¹ ¿ case.
(a) The di®erence between the two social security scenarios if °N changes and ¿
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where the di®erence to the ¿ = ¹ ¿ scenario is only the term °N @¿
@°N. Using


















































(b) To see how changes in the survival rate a®ect k and e with ¯xed replacement















The right part in the parentheses is obviously negative. To obtain the total
e®ect we have to evaluate
@('=Á)
@s . Since ' does not vary with ¿, there is no
29indirect e®ect. Thus we again only have to evaluate the change in Á including
now the change in the contribution rate ¿. Again di®erentiating (27a) with












1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®) (1 ¡ ¿)
i






where we see that the derivative is identical to the case with ¿ = ¹ ¿ except for
the last positive term. Using (52) and knowing that @Á=@s evaluated with the
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where the di®erence being only the adjusting contribution rate @¿
@!. Using equa-


















































30Proof of proposition 5. The e®ect of the degree of annuitization (¸) on the capital stock


























































A ? 0 (70b)
Qualitatively, changing ¸ has the same e®ects in both social security scenarios because
the availability of annuity markets does not interact with the adjustment of contribution
or replacement rates.
31B Numerical Results: No Annuity Markets
Table 3: Calibration parameters: No Annuity Markets
Firm sector Ã = 0:6 Ã = 0:3
Capital share, ® 0.3 0.3
Technological progress, °A 1.81 1.81
Household sector
Discount factor, ¯ 0.67 0.67
Average productivity of human capital investments, » 6.30 1.94
Coe±cient in human capital production function, Ã 0.6 0.3
Fraction of the old working, ! 0.33 0.86
Social Security
Replacement rate, % 0.6 0.6
Demographics
Birth rate, °N 1.56 1.56
Survival rate, s 0.69 0.69
32Figure 5: Elasticity of e with respect to s: No Annuity Markets
(a) Benchmark concavity (Ã = 0:6)
(i) constant ¿




































Elasticity of e w.r.t. s − Constant τ (ψ = 0.6)
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Elasticity of e w.r.t. s − Constant ρ (ψ = 0.6)
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(b) Low concavity (Ã = 0:3)
(i) constant ¿
































Elasticity of e w.r.t. s − Constant τ (ψ = 0.3)
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Elasticity of e w.r.t. s − Constant ρ (ψ = 0.3)
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33Figure 6: Elasticity of e with respect to !: No Annuity Markets
(a) Benchmark concavity (Ã = 0:6)
(i) constant ¿



































Elasticity of e w.r.t. ω − Constant τ (ψ = 0.6)
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Elasticity of e w.r.t. ω − Constant ρ (ψ = 0.6)
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Elasticity of e w.r.t. ω − Constant τ (ψ = 0.3)
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Elasticity of e w.r.t. ω − Constant ρ (ψ = 0.3)
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